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I. INTRODUCTION
Economists describe the current global financial crisis as the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.1 Moreover, the U.S.

 Leroy Sorensen Merrifield Professor of Law, George Washington University School
of Law; AB Harvard College, JD Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Gordon Smith for
inviting me to the BYU Law Review Symposium: “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory,” as well
as the participants of the symposium for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All
errors, of course, are mine.
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government’s response has been almost as unprecedented as the
crisis it is aimed to forestall and correct. Scholars have debated at
length not only the cause of the crisis,2 but also about whether the
crisis and its severity could have been predicted.3 By contrast,
relatively little attention has been paid to whether we could have
predicted America’s response to the crisis. Because the legal origins
theory purports to predict how countries respond to economic and
social problems, it has the potential to fill this void.4 In that regard,
this Article seeks to test that theory’s predictive value with respect to
America’s crisis response, and thereby shed some light on the
strength of, and limits to, the theory.
Beginning in 1997, four authors published a series of articles
based on a theory that the historical origins of a country’s laws shape
its legal rules and regulations, as well as its fundamental approach to
problem-solving.5 This theory, known as the legal origins theory or
LLSV,6 predicts that a country’s legal origin influences its laws and
regulations. As a result, the theory asserts that common law
countries and civil law countries will differ with respect to their laws
and regulations because of their legal origins. Moreover, the theory
suggests that a country’s legal origins will dictate how a country
responds to social and economic problems. That is, a country’s legal
1. E.g., Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression;
Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.
com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227.
2. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.
3. See, e.g., Peter Coy et al., What Good Are Economists Anyway?, BUS. WK., Apr. 16,
2009, at 26 (explaining why economists mostly failed to predict the crisis); Stephen Mihm, Dr.
Doom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2008, at MM26 (describing audience’s skepticism to predictions
by NYU economist Nouriel Roubini that a crisis was brewing).
4. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 285, 306–09 (2008).
5. The four authors are Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert Vishny. E.g., Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
Jan./Feb. 2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp. For examples of these articles, see Rafael La Porta et
al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta,
Quality of Government] (investigating through empirical data and comparisons what
determines the quality of governments across several countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the origin and enforcement of laws
regarding the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors across forty-nine diverse civil
law and common law countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (examining the connection between legal protections for
investors and development of capital markets in various countries).
6. An acronym of the four original theorists’ last names.
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origins shape the manner in which it confronts new economic and
political challenges.7 As a result, countries in the civil law tradition
will not only respond to problems differently than countries in a
common law tradition, but will also respond to such problems in a
particular way that is unique and consistent with their legal tradition.
In this respect, the theory not only explains the differences in the
development of institutions, but also reflects a “mode of thought” or
attitude about how best to deal with problems.8 Moreover, the
theory contends that a country’s legal tradition tends to better
predict its institutions and rules than other cultural, political, social
or economic factors.9
Important for purposes of this Article, the theory purports to
have at least some predictive value during times of upheaval.10
During such times, when legal rules change in response to a crisis,
the legal origins theory predicts that they will change in ways that are
consistent with a country’s legal tradition.11 This is because, at its
core, the theory reflects a fundamental approach to problem
solving.12 The legal origins theory stems from the premise that legal
origins “represent fundamentally different strategies of social control
of economic life, which express themselves in how countries confront
new economic or political challenges.”13 In other words, America’s
legal origins should strongly influence the manner in which the
United States approaches economic problems, and that approach
should be fundamentally distinct from the manner in which
countries from a civil law tradition respond to such problems. In this
regard, the legal origins theory should be particularly relevant in
times of crisis because it should be able to predict the manner in
which countries respond to crisis. If this theory is accurate, America’s
7. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 307.
8. See id. at 287, 307. La Porta and his co-authors, in an earlier draft of this paper,
suggested that the legal origins families represent “expressions of fundamental approaches to
solving social problems.” La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, Second
Draft, June 4, 2007, at 4, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/
corporate_governance/papers/2007fall-Speakers_9-25_Shleifer.pdf [hereinafter La Porta,
Economic Consequences, Second Draft].
9. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 310–15.
10. The Legal Origins Theory purports to have some predictive value that helps to
explain a country’s actions. Hence, this Article refers to both the predictive and explanatory
value of the Legal Origins Theory.
11. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308.
12. Id. at 307.
13. La Porta, Economic Consequences, Second Draft, supra note 8, at 7.
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legal tradition should have a profound impact on its current crisis
response. That being said, it is important to note that legal origin
theorists themselves suggest that the theory may not operate during
times of particularly severe financial turmoil.14 With this limitation in
mind, this Article seeks to test the boundaries of the legal origins
theory by assessing whether it could have predicted the manner in
which the U.S. has responded to the current economic crisis or if the
turmoil was so significant that the theory loses its predictive value.
Legal origins theory would predict that the United States
response would be steeped in a common law tradition and therefore
be at odds with a response expected from civil law entities. After
examining America’s response to date, this Article notes that, at least
on the surface, its current response seems to run counter to its legal
origins in some fundamental ways. This inconsistency suggests that
political, social, and economic forces do more to explain the United
States response to significant financial and economic turmoil than its
legal origins. From this perspective, this Article maintains that the
current crisis is so severe that it overwhelms any explanatory or
predictive value that may have been derived from the legal origins
theory. To be sure, a more nuanced examination of the United
States response does illuminate some strands of its legal tradition that
have emerged in the context of its crisis response, suggesting that the
theory may be operative, put perhaps in a more muted and nuanced
manner.
Part I of this Article gives some background on the legal origins
theory. Part II briefly highlights the current economic crisis and
pinpoints some of America’s principal responses. Part III then
explores whether those responses are consistent with the legal origins
theory. This Part demonstrates the manner in which those responses
run counter to America’s origins, thus undermining the predictive
value and hence strength of that theory, at least in the context of a
major crisis. However, Part III also reveals some ways in which the
United States response may be deemed consistent with the legal
origins tradition, and thus may validate the theory’s predictive value
even during severe upheaval. Part IV offers some concluding
thoughts about the relevance of the theory in crisis.

14. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 327.
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II. THE LEGAL ORIGINS THEORY

The legal origins theory contends that the historical origins of a
country’s laws determine its legal rules as well as the nature of its
political, economic, and legal institutions. Thus, legal origins explain
why countries have developed distinct legal rules and regulations
across a broad range of disciplines as well as distinct modes of
resource allocation and interactions between the government and its
citizens.15 Moreover, legal origins can often better explain a
country’s legal and economic institutions than political and cultural
variables.16
The legal origins theory rests on at least two premises. First,
most countries received their legal system through colonization or
some other involuntary means, making their legal origins largely
exogenous.17 In other words, conquering countries export their legal
system to other nations.18 As a result, the theory may lose its
explanatory or predictive force if a country voluntarily chooses its
legal origin—as is the case with Japan.19 Second, countries’ legal
traditions essentially fall into one of two categories: civil or common
law.20 From this perspective, differences in legal origins mainly
15. See generally Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1339
(2004) (investigating labor market regulation through applicable laws in eighty-five countries
including French civil law, Scandinavian civil law, socialist, and common law countries); La
Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 261–62 (comparing and contrasting the
influence of socialist, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, and common
law legal origins on government performance).
16. See, e.g., David M. Foster, Politics, Legal Origins, and the Roots of Modern Economic
Institutions (Mar. 25, 2005) (seminar paper for Advanced Issues in Corporate Governance,
Professor Mark J. Roe), at 3–4.
17. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286.
18. Id. at 288 (“[A] key feature of legal traditions is that they have been transplanted
typically though not always through conquest or colonization, from relatively few mother
countries to most of the rest of the world.” (internal citation omitted)).
19. Though Japan’s legal system was influenced by German civil law tradition, Japan
chose to incorporate that influence voluntarily rather than have it enforced through
colonization. See id. at 290.
20. Id. at 288. To be sure, within the civil law tradition, the legal origins theory
recognizes the distinctions between French, German, and Scandinavian civil law, while noting
that the distinctions are relatively subtle. La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at
231; see also La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 390. The theory also recognizes the socialist legal
tradition, which originates in the Soviet Union, noting that such tradition falls within the civil
law family, but with pronounced differences when compared with other civil law systems. La
Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288; La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 231.
Nevertheless, the theory rests primarily on the notion that France and England established two
dominant forms of legal systems that were then exported to countries that they conquered.
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originate from either the English common law system or the French
civil law system, both of which form the foundations of modern
common and civil law systems.21 Countries with common law origins
include the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and South
Africa.22 Although the civil law tradition originates in Roman law, it
is generally identified with France and the countries influenced by
French conquest including Portugal, Spain, Northern and SubSahara Africa, and French Caribbean Islands.23 Legal origin theorists
also have referred to groups of countries that share the same legal
tradition as legal families,24 and in this vein, England represents
“mother-country” of the common law family while France is
matriarch of the civil law countries.25
Legal origin theorists contend that a country’s legal origin
impacts the nature of its institutions, and leads to the development
of distinct features. Thus, common law systems embrace limited state
intervention and restraints on government power, resulting from its
emphasis on protecting individual rights and their private property
rights.26 By contrast, the civil law tradition is associated with
enhanced government ownership and control.27 Hence, growth of
administrative power represents a hallmark of civil law.28 Another
critical hallmark of a civil law system is the central control of banks.
Civil law systems also feature policies aimed at nationalization and
direct state control of industry.29
In addition to these features associated with government
intervention, legal origins determine the nature and role of the
judiciary within a country. For the common law system, judicial rulemaking and judicial independence are absolutely essential.30
Moreover, the power of judicial review represents a hallmark of the

21. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288–89.
22. Id. at 288.
23. Id. at 289 (“[T]he civil law tradition is the oldest, the most influential, and the most
widely distributed around the world . . . .”).
24. E.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
68 (1998); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286.
25. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288, 318.
26. La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 232.
27. See generally id. at 231–33 (asserting that the civil legal tradition demonstrates and
results in the creation of institutions to increase state power).
28. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 304.
29. Id. at 308.
30. See id. at 305.
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common law tradition. In this regard, judicial lawmaking is a central
feature of the common law ideology.
The legal origins theory also maintains that legal traditions are
robustly linked to financial development. Thus, common law
countries tend to be more economically developed with more
sophisticated financial markets and development.31 This results in
part from the strong emphasis on investor protection as well as the
higher quality of contract enforcement that emanates from the
common law tradition.32 It also results from a more independent
judiciary that helps secure property rights.33 Importantly, legal origin
theorists do not maintain that common law always produces the
most economically efficient outcome.34
In addition to being highly correlated to particular institutions
and modes of governmental regulation, the theory predicts that
countries will adopt particular attitudes or ideologies based on their
legal origins. Thus, because legal origins represent distinct strategies
regarding control of economic life, legal origins represent
fundamentally different strategies regarding how to confront
economic or political challenges.35 In this respect, legal origins
influence governmental approaches to problem solving, predicting
the strategies a country will employ to grapple with social and
economic concerns.36 The theory predicts that civil law governments’
responses will focus on expanding government control, while
common law governments will favor market solutions and reliance
on the judiciary.37 The theory further predicts that common law
governments will steer clear not only from administrative solutions
when crafting solutions to new problems, but also from the
nationalization of banks and companies.38
Finally, legal origins theorists posit that the theory may better
predict a country’s institutions and attitudes than other factors. To
be sure, the theory does not dismiss the importance of political,
cultural, or social influences. However, legal origin theorists note

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 294–98.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 307.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 308.
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that legal origins often have greater predictive power than such
influences.39 Theorists do caution that the saliency of the legal
origins hypothesis may be tested depending on the nature and extent
of certain crisis, suggesting that the theory may have important
limitations.
These observations regarding the predictive power of the legal
origins theory appear to have relevance in predicting the
government’s response to the current crisis. Indeed, the legal origins
theory certainly includes predictions about the content of that
response as well as the ideologies that would shape that response.
The next parts of this Article focus on the government’s response
and the extent to which the legal origins theory comports with that
response.
III. FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE
Many theories exist regarding what caused the current financial
crisis and why the crisis has had such a devastating impact on the
economy in the United States and abroad.40 However, most scholars

39. See id. (noting that the distinct strategies with respect to social control of business
and institutions among countries within different legal traditions have persisted despite political
and other changes within such countries); see also Foster, supra note 16.
40. See generally Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response
to the Financial Crisis, at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306342 (noting that
regulatory failures played a role in the financial crisis); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert,
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 5, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396; Hershey Friedman & Linda Friedman, The Global
Financial Crisis: What Went Wrong?, Mar. 9, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356193 (noting that the lack of appropriate regulation of the market
in general and derivatives in particular, single-minded pursuit of self-interest, and the failure of
rating agencies played a role in the financial crisis); Gary Gorton, Yale School of Management
& NBER, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Conference: The Panic of 2007
(Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Gorton.08.04.08.pdf.;
Austin Murphy, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Causes and Solutions (Nov. 4, 2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295344&rec=1&srcabs=1306342
(noting that the crisis had such a broad impact because of theoretical modeling based on
unrealistic assumptions which led to fundamental mispricing of credit default swaps); Faten
Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer (June 21, 2007) at 9,
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_SubPrimer_1108.pdf (pinpointing, among other things,
the relaxation of underwriting standards and the increase in short-term interests as factors
contributing to the financial crisis); John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy
Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nov. 2008), at 2–3, http://www.
stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf (noting that monetary excesses, or relatively loose
monetary policy reflected in unusually low interest rates, was the main cause of the financial
crisis).
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agree that many factors played a role in causing the crisis and its
ripple effect through the financial sector and broader economy. As
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke noted, those factors
included “widespread declines in underwriting standards,
breakdowns in lending oversight by investors and rating agencies,
increased reliance on complex and opaque credit instruments that
proved fragile under stress, and unusually low compensation for risktaking.”41 This section does not seek to analyze these factors or
otherwise examine the various theories regarding the cause of the
crisis, but rather provides a brief account of the financial crisis and
the government’s response in order to examine if that response
comports with the legal origins theory’s apparent predictions
regarding how the United States would respond to crisis.42
A.

A Financial Crisis and Recession

Most experts pinpoint the immediate cause of the current global
financial crisis as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the
related collapse of the subprime mortgage market.43 The boom and
41. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Speech at the Stamp Lecture, London
School of Economics: The Crisis and the Policy Response (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm.
42. For a more detailed thought assessment of the crisis and its causes, see Demyanyk &
Van Hemert, supra note 40; Gorton, supra note 40; Murphy, supra note 40.
43. In January 2009, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke described the crisis as
follows:
For almost a year and a half the global financial system has been under
extraordinary stress—stress that has now decisively spilled over to the global
economy more broadly. The proximate cause of the crisis was the turn of the
housing cycle in the United States and the associated rise in delinquencies on
subprime mortgages, which imposed substantial losses on many financial institutions
and shook investor confidence in credit markets. However, although the subprime
debacle triggered the crisis, the developments in the U.S. mortgage market were
only one aspect of a much larger and more encompassing credit boom whose impact
transcended the mortgage market to affect many other forms of credit. Aspects of
this broader credit boom included widespread declines in underwriting standards,
breakdowns in lending oversight by investors and rating agencies, increased reliance
on complex and opaque credit instruments that proved fragile under stress, and
unusually low compensation for risk-taking.
The abrupt end of the credit boom has had widespread financial and economic
ramifications. Financial institutions have seen their capital depleted by losses and
writedowns and their balance sheets clogged by complex credit products and other
illiquid assets of uncertain value. Rising credit risks and intense risk aversion have
pushed credit spreads to unprecedented levels, and markets for securitized assets,
except for mortgage securities with government guarantees, have shut down.
Heightened systemic risks, falling asset values, and tightening credit have in turn

1579

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2010 7:54 PM

2009

bust of the housing market led to financial and credit crises that
spread around the globe and triggered a recession.
Between 1997 and 2006, the United States experienced a
significant housing bubble, increasing the average price of an
American home by 124%.44 This housing bubble was encouraged by
a combination of factors, including low interest rates and
governmental policy encouraging homeownership.45 For existing
homeowners, the increased value of their homes meant that they
could extract equity from their home by refinancing at lower interest
rates. For new homeowners, low interest rates coupled with policies
encouraging home ownership translated into lower monthly
payments that made homes more affordable to more people.
Notably, home price appreciation outpaced increases in median
income levels in record numbers. For example, from 2000 to 2005
such appreciation outpaced income growth by more than six-fold.46
Consequently, while houses were more expensive, income levels did
not rise to meet that expense. Instead, borrowers were able to
purchase these more expensive houses by relying on mortgage
products that lowered their monthly payments, such as interest-only
and balloon payment loans.47 The most popular and prevalent of
such products were adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, which were
mortgages with relatively easy initial terms and rates that would reset
periodically at higher, market-based interest rates.48 By providing for

taken a heavy toll on business and consumer confidence and precipitated a sharp
slowing in global economic activity. The damage, in terms of lost output, lost jobs,
and lost wealth, is already substantial.
Bernanke, supra note 41.
44. CSI: Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007.
45. Economist John Taylor notes that the U.S. monetary policy was too easy, or “loose
fitting,” because of unusually low interest rates, and this monetary excess was the primary cause
of the boom and bust. At the very least, Taylor suggests, the unusually low interest rate policy
accelerated the housing boom and bust. John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy
Responses:
An
Empirical
Analysis
of
What
Went
Wrong
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf. Taylor also indicates that other countries
deviated from more appropriate interest rates, and that the housing boom was largest when
these deviations were the largest. Id. at 5. Taylor concludes that these global policies were
likely influenced by the Fed’s interest rate decisions. Id. at 6.
46. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF
THE NATION’S HOUSING: 2008, at 7 (2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
markets/son2008/son2008.pdf [hereinafter State of Nation’s Housing].
47. Id. at 1–2. Interest-only loans refer to loans that defer the payment of principal for a
set number of years.
48. Id.; see also Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 3.
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lower payments prior to the reset, ARMs and similar mortgage
products enabled people to secure larger mortgages and purchase
more expensive homes than they could otherwise afford. So long as
home prices increased and interest rates remained low, these
mortgage products appeared to benefit homeowners despite the
possibility of resetting at less favorable terms. This is because if
borrowers found themselves unable to make payments once the rate
reset, they had sufficient equity in their homes to refinance at a lower
rate or sell their home at a profit. During this period, people took on
additional debt to refinance or purchase homes, which caused home
mortgage debt to increase dramatically, reaching record highs in
2006 and 2007.49
Coupled with the housing bubble was the proliferation of
subprime mortgages—mortgages issued to borrowers with imperfect
credit scores because of impaired or little credit history, high debtto-income ratios, or some other characteristic that made the
borrower more prone to default.50 Such loans are distinct from prime
loans offered to borrowers with relatively good credit history.
Although the interest rates on subprime loans were higher than
those on prime loans, the vast majority of subprime loans were
ARMs with low introductory teaser rates, thereby ensuring low
monthly payments for borrowers.51 When such teaser rates reset,
most subprime borrowers simply refinanced into another subprime
loan.52 Subprime loan originations exploded during the early 2000s,
rising from $120 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005.53 By 2005,
subprime loans comprised some twenty percent of the nation’s
mortgage lending.54

49. Colin Barr, The $4 Trillion Housing Headache, FORTUNE, May 27, 2009 (noting
that home mortgage debt was at its highest levels ever in 2006 and 2007, with 2008 being the
third-highest on record, and that Americans’ mortgage debt was $10.4 trillion at the end of
2008).
50. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 2. Subprime loans are generally associated
with borrowers with a credit score below 620. Id. However, predatory and other unsavory
lending practices sometimes resulted in borrowers obtaining subprime loans even when their
credit scores would have qualified them for prime loans. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime
Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy As Housing Boom, Industry Pushed Loans to Broader
Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
51. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 3–4.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1.
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The sharp rise in subprime mortgages was spurred by financial
innovation that reduced the risk associated with providing loans to
default-prone borrowers, government policies that encouraged
homeownership, policies that increased institutions’ ability to take on
additional debt, and relaxed underwriting standards for loans. First,
financial innovations based on the mortgage industry served to
redistribute and shift the risk associated with subprime mortgages,
spurring the demand for such mortgages. Financial innovation took
several forms. As an initial matter, the process of securitization
enabled banks to pool various mortgages and sell them to investors
in the form of mortgage-backed securities, shifting the risk of such
mortgages to investors.55 Similarly, collateralized debt obligations, or
CDOs, enabled entities to pool mortgage assets and sell them in
different classes or tranches as securities, again passing the risk
related to such assets to investors.56 Even when the tranches
consisted of subprime mortgages, many of them received high credit
ratings, making them attractive to investors.57 Another important
innovation was credit default swaps and other financial derivative
products that enabled companies to purchase contracts to hedge the
risk associated with subprime mortgages.58 Such swaps essentially
allowed companies to purchase insurance against the risk of default.59
Insurance entities, particularly American International Group, Inc.
(“AIG”), recorded record profits as a result of their involvement
with credit default swaps insuring mortgage-backed securities.60
More importantly, the use of these swaps and other financial
innovations increased dramatically in the last decade, accelerating

55. Id. at 4–7.
56. DOUGLAS LUCAS ET AL., COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES
AND ANALYSIS (2006); JANET TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND
STRUCTURED FINANCE, 14–29 (2003).
57. Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the
Crisis, June 29, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427167; Elliot
Blair Smith, ‘Race to Bottom’ at Moody’s, S&P Secured Subprime's Boom, Bust,
Bloomberg.com, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109
&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo.
58. Partnoy, supra note 57, at 219–21; see also Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps:
The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008.
59. LUCAS, supra note 56, at 219–21.
60. Robert O’Harrow & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec.
31, 2008, at A01, available at http://w3.lexis.com/research2/delivery/download/retrieve.
do?filename=downgrades__downfalls.pdf&jobId=1823%3A177117329&ssb=0_512012564.
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companies’ appetite for risky loans upon which they could use such
innovations.61
Second, government policies encouraging home ownership,
particularly for middle and low income families, prompted the
creation of new loan products, in lieu of the conventional thirty-year
fixed mortgage, aimed at making mortgages more affordable.
Indeed, in order to encourage affordable housing and more flexible
loan products, government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac significantly increased their purchases of mortgagebacked securities backed by subprime loans, further fueling the
market for such securities and loans.62
Third, policies that increased the ability of financial institutions
to bear significant amounts of debt enabled such institutions to
heavily invest in mortgage backed securities and other products,
accelerating demand for subprime products. In 2004, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) altered its net capital rule in
a manner that enabled certain entities to leverage themselves an
unlimited number of times.63 Consequently, by 2007 financial
institutions routinely used thirty times leverage when making
investments.64 The new rule therefore not only enabled such
institutions to increase their investments in debt, but also ensured
that such institutions had very little equity to offset their high debt
levels.
Finally, the increased demand for mortgages not only
encouraged banks to lower their underwriting standards, but also
prompted some entities to engage in predatory lending practices.

61. In 1994, JP Morgan introduced the first credit default swap, and over the next
decade and a half, credit default swaps became the most widely traded derivative product. Id.
62. Carol D. Leoning, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10,
2008, at A01, available at http://w3.lexis.com/research2/delivery/download/retrieve.do?
filename=hud_mortgage.pdf&jobId=1822%3A177127766&ssb=0_51208285.
63. Stephen Labaton, The Reckoning: Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/
03sec.html. In 2004, the SEC changed its net capital rule, allowing firms with more than $5
million in assets to leverage themselves an unlimited number of times rather than the 12 to 1
ratio that had been in existence since 1975 when the SEC established the net capital rule.
64. John Mauldin, A Positive Third Quarter?, THE RESOURCE 2–3 (July 2009),
http://reonationwide.com/resource/09%20july.pdf. When the rule was altered, five firms
qualified and subsequently enhanced their leverage: Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Id. None of the firms survived the crisis as
independent entities, likely in large part due to the fact that their debt-to-equity ratio was too
high to absorb the losses they suffered as a result of the crisis. Id.
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Because they no longer had to absorb the risk of such lending
practices, banks were increasingly willing to offer loans to borrowers
with little or no down payment or real proof of income. Such
practices not only fueled the growth of the subprime industry, but
increased the likelihood that borrowers would obtain mortgages that
they could ill-afford. Some entities went further, purposefully luring
borrowers into inappropriate loans in light of their credit history and
income levels.65 Interestingly, one Wall Street Journal report found
that sixty-one percent of borrowers with subprime loans had credit
scores that qualified them for more attractive prime loans.66 In the
end, an insatiable appetite for subprime mortgages negatively
affected many different types of borrowers. Relaxed underwriting
standards, along with the aforementioned factors, ensured the rapid
growth of the subprime mortgage industry, and thus served to inflate
the housing bubble.
In 2006 and 2007, the housing bubble burst, causing a decline
in housing prices and a subsequent rise in home delinquencies and
foreclosures. In the first quarter of 2006, real estate prices began
cooling, and between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the first
quarter of 2006, the median U.S. housing price fell more than three
percent, beginning a steady decline in the market.67 The year 2007
saw the largest drop in home prices in twenty years,68 and the first
annual median price decline since the Great Depression.69 The
decline in housing prices made it difficult to refinance or sell homes
at a profit. Moreover, in 2004 interest rates began to climb, ensuring
that ARMs reset at higher rates, making it difficult for homeowners
to afford their new monthly payments.70 As a result, the rate of
65. Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating
Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 985 (2006).
66. Brooks & Simon, supra note 50, at A01.
67. Les Christie, Real Estate Cools Down, May 16, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/
2006/05/15/real_estate/NAR_firstQ2005_home_prices/index.htm.
68. See Martin H. Bosworth, Home Prices Drop Sharply: Unsold Homes Increase,
ConsumerAffairs.com, Aug. 29, 2007, available at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news
04/2007/08/home_sales02.html.
69. Mike Sunnucks, National Home Price Decline in 2007 Called First Drop Since Great
Depression, PHOENIX BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jan. 24, 2008, http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/
phoenix/stories/2008/01/21/daily45.html.
70. Press Release, IRS, Interest Rates Increase for the Second Quarter of 2004,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=120820,00.html.
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delinquencies and foreclosures began to rise. By August of 2008,
more than six percent of all mortgages were delinquent, while more
than two percent of loans were in foreclosure, both of which reflect
record highs.71 Most of the defaults and foreclosures were on ARMs,
particularly subprime ARMs.72 In the first quarter of 2007, the
delinquency rate for subprime loans increased to more than thirteen
percent, more than five times the delinquency rate for prime loans.73
Prime ARM foreclosures have also started to rise, and experts predict
that new foreclosures will likely be dominated by prime ARMs.74
These problems in the housing market triggered a collapse of the
subprime mortgage industry. More than twenty-five subprime
lending firms declared bankruptcy in February and March of 2007.
In April 2007, the largest independent U.S. subprime lender, New
Century Financial Corporation, filed for bankruptcy.75 In January
2008, Bank of America purchased Countrywide Financial, the largest
U.S. mortgage lender, for $4 billion as a result of its losses in the
mortgage market.76
71. Press Release, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA Nat’l
Delinquency Survey, http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/64769.htm (Sept.
5, 2008) (national survey by the Mortgage Bankers Association). The significant rise in state
foreclosures in California and Florida enhanced the foreclosures percentages and overwhelmed
improvements in other states.
72. Id.
73. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Delinquencies Decrease in Latest MBA
Nat’l Delinquency Survey, http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/55132.htm
(June 14, 2007) (reporting that delinquency rate for prime loans increased to 2.58% and to
13.77% for subprime loans).
74. Id.
75. Julie Creswell, Mortgage Lender New Century Financial Files for Bankruptcy,
NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/business/world
business/02iht-loans.5.5118838.html. The company’s shares plunged from nearly $66 a share
in 2004 to $1 in 2007. Id. In March 2007, New Century’s shares lost 90% of their value, and
the NYSE halted trading in their shares. David Cho, Huge Mortgage Lender Files Bankruptcy,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2007, at A01. When it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, New
Century also laid off more than half of its workforce. Id.
76. The Associated Press, Bank of America to Acquire Countrywide, MSNBC.COM, Jan.
11, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22606833. One of the first signals that the
decline and crisis in the housing and subprime market was being mirrored around the globe
was on September 13, 2007, when the Bank of England agreed to provide an emergency loan
to the Northern Rock, one of the UK’s largest mortgage lenders. Northern Rock Gets Bank
Bailout, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6994099.stm.
Of course, the article indicates that most believed the problems at Northern Rock and in the
mortgage industry were temporary in nature. Id. This would prove false as some five months
later, on February 17, 2008, Britain nationalized Northern Rock. Gonzalo Vian & Loveday
Morris, Northern Rock Nationalized as U.K. Rejects Virgin Bid, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 17,
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Further evidence of the market’s deterioration emerged with the
difficulties experienced by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Both
entities, heavily invested in the subprime markets, experienced
dramatic drops in stock prices and severe liquidity problems. As a
result, on September 7, 2008, the government seized control of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing them into government
conservatorship.77 At that point, such entities owned or guaranteed
about half of the mortgage market.78
The interlinked nature of the financial innovations that relied on
the prime and subprime mortgage industry ensured that declines in
that industry would severely impact other sectors. Financial
institutions that had invested in the industry began experiencing
significant losses and liquidity issues. Indeed, the securitization
market ground to a halt and credit markets froze as institutions that
held or insured mortgage-backed securities watched their assets drop
dramatically in value.
Entities invested in the subprime mortgage market began
admitting to significant losses. For example, by the end of July 2007,
Bear Stearns announced that two of its hedge funds that had
invested in various mortgage-backed securities had lost almost all of
their capital and would file for bankruptcy.79 Then too, the
investment banking industry, with its heavy involvement in
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aR399_tyWImw. The
move represented the first time since 1984 that the government was forced to nationalize a
bank, and England’s biggest bank nationalization since 1946. Id.
77. Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Treasury and Federal Housing
Finance Agency Protection to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm. In explaining the move, Treasury
Secretary Paulson stated:
And let me make clear what today's actions mean for Americans and their families.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial system
that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets
here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and negatively
impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to savings for
college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to get home
loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure
would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken
these actions today.
Id.
78. Charles Duhigg, Loan-Agency Woes Swell from a Trickle to a Torrent,
NYTIMES.COM, Jul. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/business/
11ripple.html.
79. Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth Little,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C02.
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mortgage-backed securities and derivative products, found itself in
significant turmoil. In fact, the major firms were unable to survive
without significant financial assistance and intervention. In March
2008, Bear Stearns announced major liquidity problems and was
granted a twenty-eight day emergency loan from the Federal Reserve
(the “Fed”).80 Two days later, in a transaction facilitated by financing
from the Fed, JPMorgan Chase announced that it would purchase
Bear Stearns for $2 a share, though the amount was later increased
to $10 a share.81 On September 14, 2008, after suffering liquidity
problems similar to Bear Stearns and a forty-five percent decline in
share price, Lehman Brothers was unable to obtain the same
government financial assistance as Bear Stearns and filed for
bankruptcy, making it the largest bankruptcy in history at $639
billion.82
On September 15, 2008, Bank of America announced its $50
billion purchase of Merrill Lynch in order rescue the firm from near
collapse.83 On September 21, 2008, Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, the remaining two largest investment banks, announced that
they would convert into bank holding companies, which exposed
them to additional regulation, but also afforded them access to loans
from the Fed.84
The collapse of the subprime mortgage industry also negatively
impacted the insurance industry. Most notably, AIG, which had
some $441 billion in credit default swaps, began suffering significant
losses.85 On September 16, 2008, the Fed loaned AIG $85 million

80. Bear Stearns reported a $12 billion drop in liquid assets, which represented a sixtyseven percent decline. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 13.
81. Id. at 16–20.
82. Some have argued that the government’s failure to intervene on Lehman’s behalf
worsened the financial crisis, but Taylor contends that pinpointing the non-intervention
decision as the primary reason for the increased severity of the financial crisis is questionable.
Instead, it is likely that Paulson’s testimony on the severity of the problem drove the market as
well as uncertainty about how the government would respond to the problem. Taylor, supra
note 40, at 16–17.
83. “Bank of America’s chief executive . . . [claimed] that officials in the Bush
administration and the Federal Reserve threatened to remove top executives of the bank” if it
refused to agree to the merger with Merrill Lynch. Sean Lengell, Bank Reports Threat by Fed,
WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2009, at A01.
84. See Neil Irwin & Binyamin Appelbaum, Giant Investment Banks Grasp for
Government Safety Net, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2008, at A01.
85. See Carol D. Leonnig, Government Again Expands AIG Rescue Plan, WASH. POST,
Nov. 11, 2008, at D01.
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amid concerns that AIG would collapse and trigger widespread losses
throughout the industry and financial sector.86 In exchange, the
government took a 79.9% stake in AIG.87 In October 2008, the Fed
authorized the borrowing of up to $37.8 billion in securities from
AIG.88 As of August 2009, the total investment in AIG has been
almost $120 billion, which includes asset purchases, bridge loans,
and government stakes in AIG subsidiaries.89
The banking industry similarly was marked by failures and
government bailouts. On September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual
declared bankruptcy and, in a transaction facilitated by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), sold its bank operations
to JPMorgan Chase.90 On September 28, as Wachovia appeared to
be on the verge of insolvency, Wachovia began negotiating to be
purchased by Citigroup, but ultimately closed a deal with Wells
Fargo.91
These kinds of bank failures prompted the passage of legislation
aimed at providing financial assistance to troubled banks, including
some of the largest. Two such banks receiving significant aid were
Citigroup and Bank of America. In November 2008, Citigroup,
which had just received $25 billion in government funds in October
2008, received an added $20 billion in government funds, and the
government agreed to guarantee about $306 billion in real estate
and other loans and securities.92 In exchange, the government
received $20 billion of preferred stock in Citigroup, and as a fee for
the guarantee, Citigroup agreed to issue the government an

86. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement by the Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2008/an080929.html [hereinafter Statement by the Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction].
87. Statement by the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction, supra note
86.
88. See Barry Meier & Mary Williams Walsh, AIG to Get Additional $37.8 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at B01.
89. See David Goldman, CNNMoney.com’s Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker.
90. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 41.
91. Id. at 42–43.
92. Eric Dash, Citigroup to Halt Dividend and Curb Pay, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 24,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/business/24citibank.html. For the Fed press
release on the Citigroup deal, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/20081123a.htm.
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additional $7 billion in preferred shares.93 The loan not only restricts
the payment of bonuses and certain executive compensation, but also
requires that Citigroup receive consent before paying dividends over
one cent per share.94 In February 2009, Citigroup received its third
government intervention, increasing the government’s stake in the
company up to thirty-six percent, pursuant to which the
government’s preferred shares would be converted into common
shares.95 Thus, instead of injecting cash into the company, the
government used its position to increase equity in the company.
Bank of America has received some $45 billion in government
funds, including an initial $25 billion loan and an additional $20
billion loan in January 2009.96 In addition, the government has
agreed to guarantee some $118 billion of its assets.97 The
government also agreed to absorb certain bank losses in exchange for
an additional $4 billion of preferred shares.98 The Bank of America
deal is structured like the Citigroup transaction, with the
government acquiring an equity position in the bank while imposing
compensation and governance restrictions on it. The combined loans
make the government the largest Bank of America shareholder with
approximately a six percent stake in the company.99
The collapse of the housing market and turmoil in the financial
sector has had a devastating impact on the economy, triggering a
recession both in the United States and abroad. Thus, 2007 and
2008 have been marked not only by steep drops in the stock market,
93. See Dash, supra note 92 (describing term sheet).
94. Amanda Ruggeri, Citigroup Receives Latest Government Bailout to Protect Troubled
Lending Market, U.S. NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
national/2008/11/24/citigroup-receives-latest-government-bailout-to-protect-troubledlending-market.html. The dividend restriction essentially halts dividend payments at Citigroup.
95. See David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bailout,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123573611480193881.html. At the end of July 2009, Citigroup took steps to effectuate
this conversion of the government’s stake. See Citi Takes Big Step to Giving U.S. 34 Percent
Stake, REUTERS, July 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-CreditCrisis/
idUSTRE56M6DM20090723 (describing exchange offer).
96. See Eric Dash et al., Bank of America to Receive Additional $20 Billion,
NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/world
business/16iht-16merrill.19411223.html.
97. Id.; see also Press Release, FDIC, Treasury, Fed. Reserve and the FDIC Provide
Assistance to Bank of Am. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/
pr09004.html.
98. Dash, supra note 96.
99. Id.

1589

DO NOT DELETE

2/8/2010 7:54 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

but also by heavy job losses. By March 2009, the U.S.
unemployment rate reached 8.5%, its highest level in over twentyfive years.100
As this section reveals, the boom and bust of the housing bubble
set off a chain reaction in the broader financial and economic sector.
The next section pinpoints some of the major ways in which the
government responded to this collapse.
B. The Government Response
Broadly speaking, the government responded to the economic
crisis with a steady drumbeat of legislation aimed at providing
financial assistance both to specific industries in turmoil and to the
broader economy. Moreover, as the problem worsened, each new
piece of legislation and new program appeared to have a broader
reach and mandate. This section briefly describes some of the most
critical pieces of legislation.
1. Early legislative responses
The first major legislative effort to respond to the crisis was the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (the “Stimulus Act”), signed on
February 13, 2008, by President George H.W. Bush.101 The
Stimulus Act appropriated some $266 million to provide certain tax
rebates for individuals to be paid as quickly as possible.102 For
businesses, the Stimulus Act offered one-time incentives for
investment in new equipment and write-off of tax losses.103 The
100. The Associated Press, U.S. Jobless Claims Rise more than Expected, NYTIMES.COM,
Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/business/economy/24econ.html.
101. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (Feb. 13,
2008).
102. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (“ESA”) appropriated $266 million for the
Department of Treasury to be available until September 30, 2009. See id. § 101(e). The ESA
allowed a tax rebate in 2008 of an amount equal to the lesser of an individual’s net income tax
liability or $600 (or $1200 for a joint return) as well as a $300 tax rebate per child. Id. § 101.
The ESA also allowed at least $300 in tax rebates (or $600 for a joint return) for taxpayers
who had qualified income of at least $3000, with qualified income defined as earned income,
social security benefits for seniors and certain veteran’s compensation and pensions. Id.
Although the rebates placed limits on taxpayers who earn more than $75,000 (or $150,000 for
joint returns), the rebates applied even to families that earned too little to pay taxes. See id.
(noting that qualified individuals include taxpayers with income levels of at least $3000).
103. The ESA increased the limit up to which a business could expense property
purchased and placed in service during 2008 to $250,000—its highest level ever and double
the previous limit of $125,000. See id. § 102. The ESA also provided a special tax depreciation
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Stimulus Act also increased the maximum mortgage amounts that
various government agencies could give to potential homebuyers.104
The plan deliberately did not include long term policy changes such
as permanent tax cuts. Instead, the tax rebates were designed to
improve the economy by quickly stimulating consumer and business
spending. While one study of the Stimulus Act’s impact suggests that
it did successfully stimulate spending,105 another found no significant
increase in consumption resulting from the rebates.106
On July 30, 2008, President Bush passed legislation aimed at
responding more directly to the housing crisis. The Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (the “Housing Act”) provided
some $300 billion in housing relief including additional property tax
deductions, homebuyer tax credits, and development of a refinance
program for homebuyers with subprime loans.107 The Housing Act
authorized the Federal Housing Administration (the “FHA”) to
guarantee up to $300 billion in new 30-year fixed rate mortgages for
subprime borrowers.108
2. TARP and economic reinvestment
As the economy worsened, and it appeared clear that greater
response was warranted, broader legislation surfaced. On September
20, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted a plan (the
“Paulson Plan”) to create a Troubled Assets Relief Program, or
“TARP.” The Paulson Plan, less than three pages long, proposed to
use up to $700 billion to buy mortgage-related assets from any
financial firm headquartered in the United States.109 The purpose of
allowance for certain property acquired and placed in service during the 2008 calendar year. See
id.
104. In an effort to provide liquidity to the housing markets and continue to encourage
the securitization of mortgages, the ESA temporarily increased loan limits eligible for purchase
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. § 201.
105. See Christina Broda and Jonathan A. Parker, The Impact of the 2008 Rebate,
VOXEU, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1541.
106. Taylor notes that there was no statistically significant increase in consumption as a
result of the rebate because most people saved their funds and did not spend their rebate
checks. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 12–13.
107. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654 (2008).
108. See id. § 257.
109. See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, NYTIMES.COM, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html?ref=business [hereinafter
Draft of Paulson Plan].
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the Paulson Plan was to improve the liquidity and financial condition
of entities hampered by mortgage-related assets by removing such
assets from their balance sheets. The House generated an expanded
version of the Paulson Plan, now 110 pages, and submitted it for
vote on September 29.110 Although supporters of the expanded bill
insisted that a significant bailout was necessary to avoid a collapse of
the financial and economic system, concerns about government
intervention in the financial markets and the overall efficacy of the
Paulson Plan ultimately led the House to vote it down.111 The
rejection was followed by a 778 point drop in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, the largest single-day point drop ever.112
Ultimately, on October 3, 2008, Congress enacted a revised plan
(now 451 pages), called the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 (the “Stabilization Act”).113 The Stabilization Act
established the $700 billion TARP; however, it included more details
and oversight than that proposed under the original Paulson Plan
and the rejected House bill. The Stabilization Act granted broad
authority to the Treasury Secretary to purchase “troubled assets”—
mortgages, securities, or other instruments based on or related to
such mortgages—and to develop policies and procedures related to
that purchase.114 TARP funding was approved on a graduated basis,
such that $250 billion would be immediately available and an
additional $100 billion would be released when the President
submitted a request to Congress certifying that such funds were
necessary.115 However, while the President could submit a similar
request for the final $350 billion, Congress could deny the request
through a joint resolution of disapproval.116 On January 12, 2009, at
110. See Jonathan Weisman, House Rejects Financial Rescue, Sending Stocks Plummeting,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2008, at A01; Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Rejects
Bailout Package, 228–205; Stocks Plunge, NYTimes.com, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/30bailout.html.
111. See Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 110.
112. Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 Trillion in Market Value is Gone
After House Rejects the $700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan, CNNMoney.com, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm?postversion=20
08092918.
113. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008). The Stabilization Act also temporarily raised the FDIC insurance limits to $250,000.
See id. § 136.
114. See id. § 101.
115. See id. § 115.
116. See id.
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the request of President-Elect Barack Obama, President Bush
requested the final $350 billion of TARP funds.117
Under the Stabilization Act, those who received TARP funds
also became subject to certain executive compensation and corporate
governance provisions. As an initial matter, a company receiving
TARP funding must grant the government a warrant to receive stock
or debt in the company—effectively enabling the government to take
an equity interest in all of the companies to which it distributes
TARP funds.118 The Stabilization Act also allowed the Treasury
Secretary to require companies to meet executive compensation and
corporate governance standards for the duration of the period in
which loans were outstanding. Thus, companies must impose limits
on compensation to exclude incentives for senior executives (the top
five most highly compensated executives) to take “unnecessary and
excessive risks.”119 Companies also must provide for a “claw-back” or
recovery of bonuses or other incentive-based compensation paid to a
senior executive officer based on earnings or other criteria later
proven to be materially inaccurate.120 Moreover, companies are
required to prohibit golden parachute payments to the senior
executive officer, i.e., payments made at the executive’s departure
from the company for any reason, other than payments for services
or benefits already accrued.121 Notably, the Stabilization Act
contained a grandfather clause for compensation payments made
pursuant to a valid employment contract executed on or before the
Stabilization Act’s enactment.122 When AIG, which had received
some $170 billion in financial assistance under TARP and other
plans, paid large bonuses to their executives,123 the grandfather
117. Holly Rosenkrantz, Obama Asks Bush to Seek TARP Funds From Congress,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110
&sid=aik5Wv_K3na8.
118. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 113(d), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008).
119. Id. § 111(a).
120. Id. § 111. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745, also has a claw-back provision, but it is more limited, as it only applies to the
CEO or CFO of public companies, is based solely on a financial report, and has a limited
recovery period.
121. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111(b)(2)(C), Pub. L. No. 110-343,
122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
122. Id. § 111(d).
123. David Cho & Brady Dennis, Bailout King AIG Still to Pay Millions in Bonuses;
Geithner Gets Firm to Make Revisions, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2009, at A01; Edmund L.
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clause was heavily criticized.124 Finally, the Stabilization Act
prohibited companies that received TARP assistance in excess of
$300 million from taking a deduction for federal income tax
purposes for compensation above $500,000.125
Pursuant to the newly enacted Stabilization Act, on October 28,
2008, the Treasury Department purchased $125 billion in preferred
stock from nine banks that had previously agreed to subscribe to the
TARP facility.126 Five of the banks have repaid the Treasury
Department, leaving $65 billion unpaid.127 By July 2009, the
Treasury Department had deployed $200 billion in financial
assistance to hundreds of banks.128 Only about $70 billion of these
funds have been repaid.129
On February 4, 2009, the Treasury Department announced
additional restrictions on executive compensation for TARP
recipients (the “Treasury Guidelines”).130 The Treasury Guidelines
drew a distinction between firms receiving funds through a
“generally available capital access program,” which refers to
programs having the same terms for all recipients, and firms that

Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/15/business/15AIG.html. AIG planned to pay some $165 million in bonuses. A few days
later, the House approved a 90% tax on the bonuses as well as bonuses paid by any firms
receiving significant sums of bailout money. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House
Approves 90% Tax on Bonuses After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A01, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/20bailout.html.
124. See, e.g., Dodd: Administration Pushed for Language Protecting Bonuses,
CNNPolitics.com, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/18/
aig.bonuses.congress/.
125. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, § 302(a)(5)(A)(i), Pub. L. No. 110-343,
122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
126. U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Capital Purchase
Program Transactions for October 28, 2008, through May 29, 2009, and Information on
Financial Agency Agreements, Contracts, Blanket Purchase Agreements, and Interagency
Agreements Awarded as of June 1, 2009 (GAO-09-707SP, June 2009), an E-Supplement to
GAO-09-658, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-09-707sp/; Bailed Out Banks: The
Treasury Department Has Invested About $200 Billion in Hundreds of Banks Through Its
Capital Purchase Program in an Effort to Prop Up Capital and Support New Lending,
CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/
[hereinafter Bailed Out Banks].
127. See Bailed Out Banks, supra note 26.
128. For a list of all banks that have received funds as of July 2009, see id.
129. See id.
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on
Executive Compensation, (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm.
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require “exceptional assistance,” and hence have specific negotiated
agreements with the Treasury.131 Examples of firms that fall under
this exceptional assistance definition include AIG, Bank of America,
and Citigroup. For firms receiving exceptional assistance, the new
restrictions limited total annual compensation for senior executives
to $500,000, other than restricted stock, which stock cannot vest
until the government has been repaid with interest.132 In addition,
companies receiving TARP funds must have a “say on pay” vote
from their shareholders—a non-binding vote on executive
compensation.133 The restrictions also expanded the number of
employees subject to executive compensation limits. Hence, the once
modest claw-back provision was expanded to encompass not just the
top five senior executives, but the next twenty senior executives if
they knowingly engaged in providing inaccurate information.134
Similarly, the Stabilization Act’s golden parachute prohibition was
extended to the top ten senior executives, while providing that at
least the next twenty-five executives would be prohibited from
receiving golden parachutes in excess of one year’s compensation.135
For firms participating in generally available capital access
programs, the Treasury Department announced its intention to
propose similar executive compensation rules for public comment.136
While such rules were similar to those for firms with exceptional
assistance, they were either less restrictive or applied to fewer
executives.137 These Treasury Guidelines reflected President Obama’s
efforts to “promote systemic regulatory reform” by ensuring that

131. Id.
132. Id. The Treasury Department also proposed that companies not receiving
exceptional financial assistance be subject to this limitation unless it was waived by a vote of
fully informed shareholders. The ESA already had made compensation in excess of $500,000
less attractive for companies by requiring that certain TARP recipients forgo any deduction for
compensation for federal income tax purposes in excess of that amount. Hence, the Treasury
Guidelines expand upon this requirement.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. For example, with respect to golden parachutes, the ban would apply to the top five
senior executives as opposed to ten. Moreover, instead of a complete prohibition on such
parachutes, executives in companies receiving general assistance would be restricted to
receiving a golden parachute that was no greater than one year’s annual compensation. See id.
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governance and compensation rules better promoted long-term
value and growth.138
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Reinvestment Act”),
a $787 billion economic stimulus plan.139 Similar to the 2008
Stimulus Act, the Reinvestment Act provided tax relief for
individuals and small businesses.140 However, the Reinvestment Act
sweeps more broadly than tax relief by expanding unemployment
and social welfare benefits while providing aid for education, health
care, infrastructure, and energy.
The Reinvestment Act also amended the Stabilization Act to
broaden the limits on executive compensation by providing more
comprehensive provisions.141 Although the Reinvestment Act
adopted many of the restrictions articulated in the Treasury
Guidelines, there were some differences between the two. Instead of
limiting the rules to companies receiving exceptional assistance, the
Reinvestment Act generally imposed such restrictions on all TARP
recipients.142 For example, the Reinvestment Act required that all
companies receiving TARP funds have a shareholder “say on pay”
vote.143 The Reinvestment Act mirrored the Treasury Guidelines’
claw-back provision for the top five senior executives and the next
top twenty most highly compensated executives.144 However, unlike
the Treasury Guidelines, the Reinvestment Act’s claw-back applied
to such executives regardless of their knowledge of material
inaccuracies on which their bonuses or other awards was based.145
With respect to golden parachute payments, the Reinvestment Act
tracked the Treasury Guidelines’ expansion of the prohibition to a
senior executive or any of the next five most highly compensated
employees, but made no provision for any other executives.146 The
Reinvestment Act also did not incorporate the $500,000 annual
compensation limit, but it did subject all TARP recipients to the
138.
139.
115.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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See id.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat.
See id. §§ 1001–04, 1211–12.
See id. § 7001.
See id.
Id. § 7001(e)(1).
See id. § 7001(b)(3)(B).
Id. § 7001(b)(3)(B).
See id. § 7001(b)(C).
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provision requiring that executive compensation over $500,000
cannot be deducted for federal income tax purposes.147 The
Reinvestment Act also prohibited all bonuses other than long term
restricted stock, although the number of employees prohibited from
receiving a bonus depended upon the amount of financial
assistance.148
In addition to the restrictions that tracked, at least to some
extent, the Treasury Guidelines, the Reinvestment Act imposed
further requirements. TARP recipients must have a company-wide
policy on approval for excessive or luxury expenditures.149 Further,
TARP recipients must establish a compensation committee of the
board comprised entirely of independent directors who, among
other things, generate compensation plans that exclude incentives for
unnecessary and excessive risk taking.150 The Reinvestment Act also
requires the CEO and CFO to certify in writing their compliance
with these new provisions in its annual SEC filings or to the Treasury
Secretary in the case of non-public companies.151
Finally, the Reinvestment Act directed the Treasury Secretary to
review bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation paid to
senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly
compensated employees to determine if they were inconsistent with
revised compensation provisions, TARP, or the public interest.152 If
such a determination is made, the Reinvestment Act directs the
Treasury to negotiate with the TARP recipient and employee for
appropriate reimbursements.153
In June 2009, the Treasury Department reconciled the
discrepancies between the Reinvestment Act and Treasury Guidelines
by issuing rules implementing the executive compensation provisions
of the Reinvestment Act (the “Executive Compensation Rules”).154
These Executive Compensation Rules consolidated and superseded
147. Id. § 7001(b)(1)(B) (incorporating the deduction prohibitions set forth in I.R.C. §
162(m)(5) where applicable).
148. Id. § 7001(b)(3)(D)(i).
149. See id. § 7001(d).
150. Id. § 7001(c)(2).
151. Id. § 7001(b)(4).
152. Id. § 7001(f)(1).
153. Id. § 7001(f)(2).
154. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,394 (Jun. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ec%20ifr%20fr%20web% 206.9.09tg164.pdf.
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all the previous rules and guidance regarding executive
compensation. 155 These rules essentially implemented the provisions
of the Reinvestment Act, while drawing some distinctions with
respect to the manner in which the provisions would be applied
based on the amount of financial assistance being granted to
particular TARP recipients.156 The Executive Compensation Rules
went beyond the provisions in the Reinvestment Act in some areas
by, for example, requiring additional disclosures related to
compensation matters.157 Like the Reinvestment Act, the Executive
Compensation Rules abandoned the $500,000 salary cap while
maintaining the exclusion for tax deductions over such amount.158
The Rules maintain the grandfather clause for bonuses made
pursuant to a valid employment contract and even extended the
grandfathered period to agreements made on or before February 11,
2009.159 The Executive Compensation Rules also appointed a special
master for TARP Executive Compensation who has responsibility for
interpreting the executive compensation and governance provisions
under TARP.160
As the foregoing suggests, the government’s response to the
crisis consisted primarily of legislation providing for increased levels
of support and intervention.
3. Some key initiatives from the Federal Reserve
The Fed initially responded to the crisis by lowering interest
rates. In September 2007, the Fed made its first in a series of interest

155. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. at
28,396.
156. See Sullivan & Cromwell, Strict New Executive Compensation Standards Under
TARP, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/b6b306e9-66cc-4e7a8424-12ed3206f273/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec4d87cb-6f07-4e1b-9f06770f8bc4b992/SC_Publication_Strict_New_Executive_Compensation_Standards_Under_TA
RP.pdf.
157. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP
Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance (Jun. 10, 2009), http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg165.htm.
158. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. at
28,396. Presumably, the cap still applies to companies that have already agreed to such
restriction. Moreover, the Treasury Department still has the ability to demand such a cap in
future negotiations with companies needing exceptional assistance.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 28,397.
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rate cuts.161 The rate cuts were designed to “forestall some of the
adverse effects” of the tightening credit market.162 Thus, the Fed
continued its rate cuts as the economy weakened in an effort to
counteract the deteriorating conditions in the market. 163 The Fed
also participated in coordinate rate cuts, such as the one in October
2008 with the central banks of the European Union, Britain, China,
Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.164 By December 2008, the Fed
established a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25%,
while lowering the discount rate to 0.5%.165
In addition to these interest rate cuts, the Fed instituted various
formal and informal financial assistance programs aimed at
stimulating the economy and revitalizing particular companies. As
Part III.B reveals, the Fed played an instrumental role in assisting
several financial institutions. Moreover, the Fed instituted various
funding facilities including two aimed at directly at benefiting
consumers and struggling businesses. Thus, on October 6, 2008, the
Fed responded to the growing deterioration in the commercial paper
market by establishing a Commercial Paper Funding Facility, which

161. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 18, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070918a.htm. On September
18, the Fed lowered its target rate fifty basis points to 4.75% and lowered the discount rate fifty
basis points to 5.25%.
162. Id.
163. In October, both the target rate and the discount rate were lowered to 4.5% and 5%
respectively. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071031a.htm. In January,
the rate was lowered seventy-five basis points to 3.5% for the target rate and 4% for the
discount rate, noting that market conditions had continued to deteriorate along with further
tightening of the credit market. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan.
22, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080122b.htm.
Eight days later, the Fed lowered the target and discount rates again to 3% and 3.5%
respectively. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 30, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080130a.htm.
164. This action brought the federal funds rate to 1.5% and the discount rate to 1.75%.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081008a.htm. The interest
rate was lowered again on October 29, 2008, to 1% and 1.25%. Press Release, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20081029a.htm.
165. On December 16, 2008, the rate was again lowered to a target range for the federal
funds rate of 0 to .25% and a discount rate of .5%. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20081216b.htm.
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would purchase short-term loans (commercial paper) from banks.166
The Facility aimed to provide liquidity to the commercial paper
market, thereby seeking to provide vital assistance to the many
companies that used commercial paper to finance their day-to-day
operations.167 On November 25, 2008, the Fed created the Term
Asset–Backed Loan Facility (“TALF”) to lend up to $200 billion to
support consumer loan-backed securities with the aim of reviving the
securitization market for consumer loans such as student loans,
credit cards, and auto loans.168 This market had virtually halted by
the second half of 2008.169 Eventually, available funds under TALF
were expanded to $1 trillion, and TALF was expanded to cover
additional assets including commercial and residential leases.170 These
more formal programs were in addition to periodic loans provided to
various companies.
4. The automaker bailout
In mid-November 2008, representatives from the “Big Three”
automakers—General Motors (“GM”), Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”),
and Chrysler LLC (“Chrysler”)—met with lawmakers to discuss their
dire financial condition and testified before Congress requesting
financial aid.171 GM, whose shares plunged to a six-decade low,
warned that it was almost out of cash and without aid it would likely
declare bankruptcy by year’s end.172 The automakers faced
166. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm. The Facility
funds a special purpose vehicle that purchases three-month unsecured and asset-based
commercial paper. The Facility became effective on October 27, 2008.
167. See id.
168. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm.
169. Adam B. Ashcraft et al., The Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (Mar.
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361712.
170. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 10, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090210b.htm.
171. The CEOs flew to Washington on private jets, spurring significant criticism and
outrage. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Auto Execs Fly Corporate Jets to D.C., Tin Cups in Hand,
WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2008, at A03 (quoting Rep. Gary Ackerman as saying, “There’s a
delicious irony in seeing private luxury jets flying into Washington, D.C., and people coming
off of them with tin cups in their hands.”). When they came again to Washington asking for
funds, the CEOs flew commercial.
172. Chris Isidore, GM: Almost Out of Cash, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 7, 2008, http://
money.cnn.com/2008/11/07/news/companies/gm/index.htm [hereinafter Isidore, GM:
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opposition not only from those who balked at giving money to a
sector deemed to be poorly managed, but also from those who
believed that TARP funds should be used only to assist the financial
sector.173 In addition, Congress was reluctant to institute another
bailout on the heels of the recently enacted Stabilization Act.
However, after considerable negotiation, a $25 billion auto-bailout
bill was introduced in the House, entitled the Auto Industry
Financing and Restructuring Act, which pulled funds from the $700
billion TARP funds (the “Initial Auto Bill”).174 The Initial Auto Bill
enabled the president to designate an executive, dubbed by many as
an “auto czar,” to administer the funds and oversee the plan.175
Similar to provisions regarding TARP funds, the bill required the
government to take warrants for an equity interest in the
automakers. The equity taken would likely have ensured that the
government owned a majority stake in all three automakers. The Bill
also included executive compensation limits similar to TARP such as
restrictions on bonuses to the top twenty-five highest paid officers
and bans on golden parachutes.
Concerns regarding the size of the Bill and reliance on TARP
funds led the House to abandon it in favor of a revised bill (the
“Revised Bill”) that cut the aid to $14 billion and, instead of TARP
funds, drew on funds previously appropriated under the Energy
Independence and Security Act—a source that many Democrats
were reluctant to tap because it was designated for enhancing fuelefficient vehicles.176 The Revised Bill required automakers to issue
warrants to the government equal to twenty percent of the loan
amount in exchange for loans.177 The Revised Bill also contained
restrictions on executive compensation similar to TARP and

Almost Out of Cash]; Chris Isidore, GM: Bailout Push Can’t Halt Stock Slide,
CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/10/news/companies
/gm_stock/index.htm [hereinafter Isidore, GM: Bailout Push].
173. See Isidore, GM: Almost Out of Cash, supra note 172; Isidore, GM: Bailout Push,
supra note 172.
174. Senate to Take Up Auto Bailout Bill on Monday, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27718233/ns/business-autos//.
175. Id.
176. See Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, H.R. 7321, 110th Cong. §
10(a)(1) (2007).
177. Id. § 12(a)(2)(A); Peter Valdes-Dapena, Auto Bailout ABCs, CNNMONEY.COM,
Dec. 11, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/11/autos/auto_bailout_outline/index.
htm?cnn=yes.
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prohibited dividend payments during the period when an automaker
was receiving financial assistance.178 Moreover, each automaker
would have to submit a restructuring plan detailing its proposal for
achieving long-term viability.179 The Revised Bill retained the autoczar, and gave the czar the ability to review and prohibit any
transactions valued in excess of $100 million.180 Although the
Revised Bill passed the House on December 10, it died in the Senate
one day later.181
The Revised Bill’s death in the Senate compelled President Bush
to provide automakers with a lifeline. Based on the belief that such a
lifeline was necessary to prevent the collapse of the American auto
industry, on December 19, 2008, President Bush announced a plan
(the “Auto Plan”) pursuant to which he would use funds from
TARP to provide an emergency loan of up to $13.4 billion for GM
and $4 billion for Chrysler.182 In most respects the Auto Plan
mirrored the Revised Bill. For example, the Auto Plan continued to
require that automakers produce a long-term plan for their
profitability by March 31, 2009.183 The Auto Plan also included
limits on executive pay, bans on golden parachutes, and provisions
requiring companies to sell their corporate jets.184 Moreover the
Auto Plan required that companies reach an agreement with the
unions on wage and benefit cuts.185 Since the plan’s implementation,
while Ford has not taken any money pursuant to the Auto Plan, GM
and Chrysler automakers have received some $80 billion in financial
assistance.186
Despite significant federal assistance, both Chrysler and GM
ultimately declared bankruptcy. On April 30, 2009, the government
essentially forced Chrysler to file for bankruptcy protection so that it
could pursue a transaction with a foreign automaker, in what the
New York Times referred to as “yet another extraordinary
178. Valdes-Dapena, supra note 177.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Auto Bailout Dies in Senate, CNN.COM, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/US/12/11/auto.bailout/index.html.
182. David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A01.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Goldman, supra note 89.
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intervention into private industry by the federal government.”187 On
June 1, 2009, GM declared bankruptcy in one of the largest
bankruptcies in history.188 When GM emerged from bankruptcy on
July 10, 2009, the government owned sixty percent of its stock as a
result of its financial assistance.189
C. Concluding Assessments
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the financial crisis
prompted an unprecedented response from the government. The
legal origins theory purports to predict how countries respond to
legal problems and crises based on their legal origins. In order to test
the saliency of this theory, the next section seeks to examine whether
America’s crisis response can be viewed as consistent with its legal
origins.
IV. A THEORY THROUGH THE PRISM OF CRISIS
A. The Wrong Tool Kit?
Even a casual examination of the government’s actions during
the crisis strongly suggests that many of the ways in which the
United States has responded to the crisis contradict its legal tradition
and instead resemble what one would consider a civil law response.
This Section will describe the manner in which America’s response to
the crisis appears to run counter to its legal roots.
1. Over-reliance on legislation
As an initial matter, the very fact that the United States response
has been dominated by legislative action, and in some cases executive
action, poses problems for the legal origins theory. As the United
States’ legal origins are rooted in the common law tradition, the
legal origins theory suggests that the United States response will
emphasize judicial rulemaking over legislative response to social or

187. Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A01.
188. Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama is Upbeat for G.M.’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2009, at A01; Peter Whoriskey, GM Emerges From Bankruptcy After Landmark Government
Bailout, WASH. POST, July 10, 2009, at A1.
189. Whoriskey, supra note 188.
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economic problems.190 In stark contrast to this prediction, however,
the United States response has been marked by a series of farreaching legislative and executive actions. This includes three major
stimulus plans, comprising more than $1.7 trillion in government
spending.191 In addition to a general stimulus, Congress also enacted
a housing bill with a $300 billion price tag.192 With the enactment of
the commercial paper facility and TALF, the Fed also seemed to
embrace a legislative oriented response to the crisis. Furthermore,
the fact that there were two, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to enact
legislation directed at revitalizing the auto industry underscores the
tendency to rely on legislative solutions to the problems created by
the crisis. While we ultimately abandoned these legislative initiatives,
they were replaced not by judicial rulemaking, but by executive
actions. Since such actions essentially mirrored those embodied in
the abandoned legislation, they could be viewed as tantamount to a
legislative response, again appearing to reflect a preference for
legislative solutions during this current crisis. This legislative
preference is incompatible with the legal origins theory’s emphasis
on the common law tradition of de-emphasizing reliance on
legislation.
In addition to the Auto Plan, we have seen a series of executive
actions, such as those related to executive compensation, that closely
resemble legislative initiatives and thus evidence an apparent reliance
on legislation as the more appropriate response to severe economic
problems. Given the extent of the credit and financial crisis, this
flurry of legislative activity may not be surprising. Indeed, it may be
that during times of crisis it is difficult to look to courts because of
their inability to respond quickly in shaping the progression of law.
Moreover, even legal origins theorists acknowledge that countries
may have a mix of common law and civil law strategies.193 However,
those theorists also predict that a country’s legal origins will dictate
which strategies dominate. In this respect, because the United States
response has relied heavily and extensively on legislative and
executive action, it poses problems for the legal origins theory

190. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308, 310.
191. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (discussing the 2008 Stimulus Act, the 2008 Stabilization
Act, and the 2009 Reinvestment Act).
192. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
193. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 309.
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because that theory emphasizes America’s reliance on judicial
rulemaking for problem solving.
As will be expounded below, this increased reliance on legislation
represents a familiar criticism of the legal origins theory: many
common law nations increasingly have come to rely on legislation in
a manner seemingly inconsistent with a supposed orientation
towards judicial rule making.194 The government’s response to the
current crisis echoes and appears to support those criticisms. This
criticism seems especially potent in the context of the current crisis
because of the significant reliance on legislation as a crisis response.
Importantly, the breadth of America’s dependence on legislation
suggests that, at least during this crisis, the United States has moved
quite dramatically away from a common law response and by so
doing has strayed significantly from its legal origins.
To be sure, this reliance may be explained by political changes
since both the White House and Congress changed political
affiliations during the crisis. Of course, while the Obama
administration has enacted legislation since its tenure, the Bush
administration’s legislative responses outpace those of President
Obama’s administration. The Bush administration was responsible
for enacting three major housing and stimulus packages as well as the
Auto Plan and a host of initiatives from the Fed. However, political
changes may do little to explain the heavy reliance on legislation
since that reliance appeared to remain constant despite those
changes195
In derogation of the legal origins theory, it would appear that
the economic climate and severity of the crisis explains not only the
relatively unprecedented reliance on legislation, but also the shift
away from America’s common law traditions. If this observation is
accurate, it indicates that economics rather than legal origins better
predicts America’s response to social and economic problems, while
at the very least suggesting that legal origins may be less relevant in
the context of this current economic turmoil.

194. See id. at 310.
195. To be sure, it may be that the nature of the legislation changed with the change in
political parties.
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2. An emergent administrative and executive state
The legal origins theory indicates that reliance on administrative
power is the hallmark of the civil law system. However, the United
States response has not only heavily relied on administrators and
regulators, but has also spurred the growth of administrative power.
Since the inception of the crisis, the government’s response has
relied quite heavily on the Fed, placing increased discretion and
authority in the hands of a single administrator. The Fed is an
independent government body that oversees the nation’s monetary
policy and seeks to maintain the stability of the financial system.
Consistent with that role, the Fed was on the front lines in setting
monetary policy in response to the crisis and instituting programs
aimed at stimulating the economy. However, the Fed’s authority and
responsibility increased as the crisis worsened. Fed Chairman
Bernanke facilitated or orchestrated many of the initial bailouts,
including those involving Bear Stearns, AIG, and Merrill Lynch.196
The Fed Chairman also was intimately involved with structuring deal
terms for these transactions in a manner that was both
unprecedented and at odds with a common law tradition. Although
the crisis may have necessitated the Fed’s actions, and even made
such actions predictable at some level, that predictability does not
seem attributable to legal origins. As a result, those actions seem to
undercut the force of the legal origins theory in the context of crisis.
The increased role and power of the Fed coincided with a
heightened role for the Treasury Secretary. Like the Fed, the
Treasury Secretary played an increasingly significant role in
structuring bailout deals and setting financial policy. In this role, the
Treasury was on the forefront of announcing corporate governance
and executive compensation guidelines.197 Notably, the Treasury
Secretary developed the TARP concept, and hence the primary
stimulus legislation responsible for more than $1 trillion in
government expenditure can be traced directly to the Treasury’s
heightened involvement in the crisis.198 Consistent with the
expansion of the Treasury Secretary’s role during the financial crisis,
the Stabilization Act vests significant control and discretion in the
196. Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 3.
197. See supra notes 126–34, 141, 168 and accompanying text.
198. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 117 (describing the original Paulson Plan upon which
the Stabilization Act and Recovery Act were based).

1606

DO NOT DELETE

1571

2/8/2010 7:54 PM

The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis

Treasury Secretary to implement the TARP funding program,
purchase and manage assets, and give guidance on foreclosure
efforts.199
Interestingly, most of America’s legislative actions create a host
of administrators and regulators, appearing to further enhance its
reliance on administrative power. The Stabilization Act provides for
some eight different regulators or oversight boards with some
responsibility to oversee TARP.200 In fact, the Act provides for four
bodies with some oversight role: the Office of Financial Stability, the
Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Credit Review Committee,
and the Congressional Oversight Panel.201 The Act also directs the
Comptroller General to provide ongoing oversight of TARP and
monitor the performance of the TARP program.202 The Stabilization
Act also creates the Office of the Special Inspector for TARP who
must audit and investigate the activities of Treasury in connection
with TARP.203 Additionally, the Reinvestment Act as implemented
by the Treasury appoints a special master to help implement TARP’s
executive compensation and governance standards.204 As Professors
Steve Davidoff and David Zaring emphasize, Treasury Secretary
Paulson and Fed Chair Bernanke appeared to be the unspoken
leaders of the unparalleled government intervention in the
economy.205 While many may dispute the appropriateness of their
actions, most would likely concur that the fact that they wielded
such authority does not align with a common law tradition.
Beyond the administration of TARP, the initial and revised auto
bills contemplated the creation of a so-called “auto czar,” a

199. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613, § 101 (2008).
200. This includes the Treasury Secretary, Assistant Treasury Secretary, the Office of
Financial Stability, the Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Credit Review Committee, the
Comptroller General, the Inspector General, and the Congressional Oversight Panel.
201. The Congressional Oversight Panel consists of five members, one chosen by each of
the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority leader, the Senate
minority leader, and both the Speaker of the House and Senate majority leader after
consultation with the minority leaders. See Economic Stimulus Act § 125. The Financial
Stability Oversight Board consists of the Chairman of the Fed, the Treasury Secretary, the
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the SEC Chair, and the Secretary of HUD.
See id. § 104.
202. Id. § 116.
203. Id. § 121.
204. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. §
30.11(a) (2009).
205. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 3.
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contemplation that dramatically diverges from its common law
tradition. Even though President Bush’s Auto Plan rejected the
concept of an “auto czar”, his plan nonetheless vests discretion in
the Treasury Secretary to implement the plan and hence continues to
embrace a reliance on regulators. To be sure, the proliferation of
legislation almost demands an increased reliance on administrators to
ensure the proper administration of the various programs
encompassed in the legislation. Such reliance reflects an inevitable
outgrowth of the shift towards enhanced legislation. Yet, just like
that shift, the over-reliance on these agents is not consistent with
America’s legal origins, and thus cannot be explained by those
origins.
3. Government intervention and the ideology of crisis legislation
Several scholars have criticized the legal origins theory because of
the growing importance of legislation and administrative power over
judicial rule-making.206 The architects of the theory call this criticism
unwarranted, contending that the theory is nevertheless still salient
most importantly because even when common law nations adopt
legislative responses, those responses will express “the common law
way of doing things.”207 According to legal origins theorists, there is
a guiding ideology or “tool kit” germane to each legal system, and
legislation enacted under particular systems will embrace tools from
their appropriate kit.208 In other words, the legislation will reflect
America’s common law ideologies. However, this prediction is not
borne out by the examination of legislation passed in response to the
financial crisis. In effect, the legislation enacted in response to the
crisis fails to express a common law ideology, but rather borrows
tools from the civil law kit.
Perhaps most problematic for proponents of the legal origins
theory are legislative efforts seemingly aimed at controlling banks.
The quintessential hallmark of a civil law system—and thus one of its
primary tools—is control of the banking system.209 Despite the
United States’ common law tradition, one of the primary and earliest
legislative and regulatory responses to the crisis was exchanging

206.
207.
208.
209.
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capital for equity in banks, thereby granting the government a stake
in such entities. Under TARP, the government has injected over
$200 billion into the U.S. banking system, and such injection has
been coupled with the government taking an equity position in
hundreds of banks.210 Some scholars maintain that the government’s
initial outlay of $125 billion to the nation’s nine largest financial
institutions in return for equity represents “a partial nationalization
which the United States had never seen before.”211 Still others have
referred to the government’s efforts on behalf of the banking
industry as “shadow nationalization.”212 This is because the
government has managed to take significant stakes in some
companies. For example, the government is the largest shareholder
at Bank of America, and one expert has argued that the
government’s latest transaction with Citigroup “covers up the
underlying reality that the government is already essentially the
majority shareholder in Citigroup.”213 These actions significantly
undermine the credibility of the legal origins theory in the context of
the current crisis.214 Even beyond equity positions, the U.S.
government has implemented other strategies that increase its
control over bank activities. Some of its transactions impose
restrictions on divided payments to shareholders, and others regulate
executive compensation by prohibiting golden parachutes, restricting
executive salary, and even mandating “say on pay” votes for
shareholders.215 In addition to the reports and disclosures required
for TARP recipients, in February 2009, new Treasury Secretary

210. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
211. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 3.
212. Edmund L. Andrews, Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan.16, 2009, at B1 (quoting a managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics).
213. Id. (quoting a managing partner at Institutional Risk Analytics).
214. Ironically, one of the first countries to exchange government funding for equity in
banks was England—the “mother” of the common law approach. Moreover, Britain
nationalized one of its banks as early as February 2008, a decision wholly at odds with the
common law tradition that shuns such control over the banking industry. See supra note 76;
David Jolly, In Europe, a Stronger Push to Oversee Banks, NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 20, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/business/worldbusiness/20ukbanks.html?fta=y.
Britain’s actions further undermine the credibility of the legal origins theory in the context of
the current crisis. Indeed, if that theory cannot be used to explain the behavior of common
law’s mother, then surely it cannot be used to predict the actions of her children.
215. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
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Timothy Geithner unveiled the “stress tests” plan for large banks.216
The test is aimed at enabling the government to determine the
strength of a bank’s balance sheet, and hence further enhances the
government’s involvement in the banking arena.217 These actions,
coupled with those involving direct equity positions in banks,
indicate that the government is taking greater control over the
banking system, which the legal origins theory suggests should not
be a fundamental solution to America’s economic and financial
problems.
Outside of banking, the government has embraced actions that
expand its control over industries in a manner that belies the legal
origins theory’s predictions. Like government control over banking,
civil law is closely associated with a “heav[y] hand of government
ownership and regulation.”218 And yet, despite its common law
roots, the U.S. government has responded to the crisis in a similar
vein. Three examples highlight this phenomenon. First, the
government seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In so
doing, the government became the owner or guarantor of some
forty-two percent of American mortgages219 and, therefore, directly
regulates a sizeable chunk of the mortgage industry. One expert
called the government’s decision to take over Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, “one of the most sweeping government interventions
in private financial markets in decades.”220 Second, the government’s
actions related to AIG have resulted in the government injecting as
much as $173 billion into AIG221 and owning almost eighty percent
of its shares, essentially reflecting a nationalization of AIG222 at odds
with the common law tradition.
A third example is the failed and then revitalized response to the
problems in the automobile industry. Under the final Auto Plan, the
government not only acquires a stake in auto companies, but its
stake is even greater than those acquired in the banking arena.
216. See Deborah Solomon & Jon Hilsenrath, Bank Capital Gets Stress Test, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 26, 2009, at A3.
217. See id.
218. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286, 298.
219. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 25.
220. Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie: Regulators Seek to
Keep Firms’ Troubles From Setting Off Wave of Bank Failures, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at
A01.
221. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 34.
222. See id. at 30–34.
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Moreover, in addition to restrictions on dividends and executive
compensation, the Auto Plan restricts certain expenditures and
requires auto executives to submit restructuring plans that have a
host of target goals, including restructuring contracts with various
stakeholders. The fact that the first two auto bills provided for the
creation of an auto czar emphasizes the levels of control embodied in
the legislative response, and the final Auto Plan’s reliance on the
Treasury Secretary does little to negate this emphasis. Reflecting the
extent of government intervention in the industry, one commentator
referred to the government’s actions as “Nationalizing Detroit.”223
From a legal origins perspective, the terms of all of the auto plans do
not reflect America’s common law ideologies, discrediting the notion
that its origins would dictate the manner in which the United States
responds to crisis. By straying from its origins, America’s response
suggests that factors beyond legal origins have played a greater role
in shaping its behavior.
Another government response highlighting its interventionist
tendencies is its active participation in deal structuring. For instance,
the government was actively involved in structuring the deal to have
JP Morgan purchase Bear Stearns. Its involvement included rejecting
market-based solutions in favor of a government-controlled response
to Bear Stearns’s distress.224 Similarly, the government played a
critical role in structuring a deal for Wachovia, pursuant to which the
FDIC selected Citigroup as a suitor and initially rebuffed attempts by
Wells Fargo to participate in the transaction. As Professors Davidoff
and Zaring note, these actions reveal a “preference for orderly as
opposed to market solutions.”225 Of course, Wells Fargo eventually
acquired Citigroup with the government’s approval. However, the
government continued its role as dealmaker so that when Citigroup
sued Wells Fargo and Wachovia, the FDIC intervened and attempted
to mediate among the parties.226 The government also played an
instrumental role in both the Washington Mutual and Bank of

223. See James L. Gattuso, Auto Bailout Bill: Nationalizing Detroit?, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION WEB MEMO NO. 2164, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/
economy/wm2164.cfm.
224. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 12. Because only the Fed would provide
financial assistance to JP Morgan, it essentially locked other potential bidders out of the
process. Id.
225. Id. at 42.
226. Id. at 43.
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America transactions.227 Finally, the government structured
transactions for the automakers, apparently forcing Chrysler to
declare bankruptcy and enter into negotiations with particular
parties.228 Because common law countries are supposed to prefer
market-based solutions over government-sponsored transactions, this
kind of extensive interaction seems at odds with the United States
common law tradition.
This discussion reveals that, from its role as dealmaker to its
actions that serve to control banking activities and the actions of
entities in other industries, the government embraced practices that
ran counter to its legal origins.
4. The marginalization of judicial review
Perhaps more troubling than the reliance on legislation is the
role that the legislation carves out for the courts. The bedrock of the
common law system is reliance on judicial rulemaking to shape the
law and respond to social and economic problems.229 It is then
notable that the Paulson Plan introducing the first TARP proposal
made no role for judicial authority at all.230 Instead, the Paulson Plan
indicated that the Treasury Secretary’s decisions “may not be
reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.”231 The
Paulson Plan provided for the Treasury Secretary to report to
Congress, while authorizing the Treasury Secretary to take any
actions it deemed necessary to carry out the purchases.232 The
ultimate Stabilization Act did provide for very limited judicial review
under an arbitrary and capricious standard. While this is a standard
used for all agency decisions, its deferential nature scarcely allows for
significant judicial rulemaking.233 Given the central role judicial

227. See id. at 41–42.
228. See Rutenberg & Vlasic, supra note 187, and accompanying text.
229. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 303–05.
230. The first TARP plan was only three pages and rested the sole discretion of the plan
with the Treasury Secretary. See Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 47.
231. See Draft of Paulson Plan, supra note 109.
232. This means that the lack of judicial review is accompanied by an apparent lack of
Congressional review. See Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 48–49 (noting that the bill
may have unconstitutionally delegated an undefined amount of Congress’s power to the
Treasury and as a result, the bill likely would have been problematic under the nondelegation
doctrine).
233. On the one hand, Professors Davidoff and Zaring do note that the government wins
between 55–65% of cases under such a standard, id. at 52, suggesting that there is a substantial
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rulemaking plays in the common law tool kit, this relatively minimal
role also undermines the extent to which the legal origins theory
may be viewed as influencing government actions in this area.
The Fed’s prominent role in the crisis response further
diminished the role for judicial oversight. This is because, in many
respects, the Fed’s actions apparently are removed from judicial
review. Thus, courts have not substantively reviewed monetary policy
decisions and bank financial assistance.234 For example, when
shareholders challenged the Bear Stearns deal, the Delaware
Chancery court refused to review the decision.235 Similarly, Bear
Stearns shareholders opted to forgo challenging the deal in New
York based on concerns that the court would be reluctant to review
the deal.236 In relying primarily on the Fed, the governmental
response inevitably strayed from reliance on judicial rulemaking or
review.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the United States response
has been guided by initiatives and tools that are distinctly civil law in
nature. The embrace of these civil law devices not only suggests that
the crisis prompted the United States to reject its origins, but also
that other forces, such as social or political concerns, have driven its
response more than any adherence to such origins.
B. A Second Look at the Kit and Tools
To be sure, if one looks more deeply at the United States crisis
response, strands of its legal origins emerge. While those strands may
not overcome the heavy focus on civil law strategies, they
nevertheless suggest that the legal origins theory many have some
predictive value even in the midst of crisis.
1. Nationalization by any other name . . .
As an initial matter, the characterization of America’s relationship
with banks as nationalization appears to be exaggerated. This is
percentage of cases successfully challenged. On the other hand, because the Act prohibited any
form of equitable relief, it leaves unclear how the judicial review would work in practice. Id. In
other words, the Act itself may have stripped the teeth out of any purported judicial review. See
id. (“[T]he bill appeared to grant judicial review in one section, and then took it away, by
taking away equitable relief, in the other section.”).
234. Id. at 15.
235. Id. at 19.
236. Id. at 10–20.
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because the government’s actions do not really amount to control
over the banks. Indeed, the equity positions the government takes in
the banks must either be nonvoting or taken with the agreement not
to vote. Moreover, as is clear from the backlash associated with the
government’s apparent inability to prohibit problematic practices at
banks and other institutions, much of the newly enacted legislation
does not dictate bank lending practices nor does it require banks to
account for how they spend government funds. The TARP program
has been criticized because lawmakers cannot track how the money is
spent, revealing that it has no real control over banks and how they
operate or use their resources.237 To be sure, all of these things have
been viewed as causes for concern—and it seems like they will be
altered going forward—but the lack of control over bank practices
and procedures undermines the nationalization claim.238 It also
suggests that the legislation has been implemented in a way that is
consistent with America’s traditions of allowing the banking industry
to shape its own policies, even if that implementation is detrimental
and may breed fraud.
Moreover, the government has taken great pains to ensure that
its investment activities did not amount to nationalization. Hence,
with respect to Citigroup, instead of creating a relatively straightforward transaction that would lead to nationalization, the
government created a complicated financing structure for some of its
Citigroup investments to avoid the appearance of nationalization. In
doing so, the government displayed its willingness to “‘bend[] over
backwards’” to prevent nationalization.239 These concerted efforts
indicate a strong allegiance to the common law’s rejection of
controlling banks even in the midst of crisis. As a result, they confirm
the enduring influence of legal origins.
2. Paved with good intentions?
Another factor supporting the legal origins theory is the stated
purpose behind America’s regulation and legislation. Indeed, the
237. See Jack Healy, Regulators Urge Better Oversight of Bailout Fund, NYTIMES.COM,
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/worldbusiness/05iht06tarp.19963306.html.
238. See id. (noting lack of oversight programs with TARP and that it was vulnerable to
fraud).
239. Enrich & Solomon, supra note 95 (quoting the chief investment officer of Spectrum
Asset Management).
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legal origins theory would be irrelevant if it could not account for
the growth of the regulatory state. However, proponents of the
theory insist that legal origins predicts a distinction between
common law and civil law countries based on their rationale for
regulation. Common law oriented countries regulate for the purpose
of supporting and rehabilitating markets.240 This rationale certainly
appears to be embedded in most of America’s regulation aimed at
responding to the crisis. The Paulson Plan provided that in
exercising authority to distribute government funds, the Treasury
consider two principles: “providing stability or preventing disruption
to the financial markets or banking system[,] and protecting the
taxpayer.”241 These considerations mirror the common law concern
with protecting private property and supporting markets.
Such considerations find their counterpart in many other
initiatives. The preamble of the Stimulus Act indicates that its
purpose is to “provide economic stimulus . . . [and] incentives for
business investment . . . .”242 The preamble of the Stabilization Act
indicates that its purpose is to stabilize the financial system and
prevent disruption in the economy.243 The Reinvestment Act’s
purpose included stabilizing government budgets and promoting
economic recovery.244 Along these lines, much of the Fed’s actions
were designed to shore up the credit markets and forestall a
deepening crisis.245 The Fed’s commercial paper facility was designed
to increase liquidity, while TALF was designed to increase the
availability of credit and thereby support economic activity.246 In
each of these instances, the United States rhetoric and rationale
coincide with a legal origins orientation. To the extent the rationale
240. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308–09.
241. Draft of Paulson Plan, supra note 109.
242. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008).
243. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
244. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat.
115. Of note, the Reinvestment Act’s purposes sweeps more broadly, encompassing a desire to
preserve and create jobs and assist those impacted by the recession. See id. These broader
mandates are less compatible with a common law ideology, and perhaps reflect the influence of
the political shift.
245. See supra notes 182–83.
246. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm; see also Healy,
supra note 237 (noting that the aim of the consumer lending program is to draw customers
back to frozen student, car, and business loan markets).
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for regulation matters more than the tools used to implement that
regulation, these statements of purpose validate the influence of legal
origins.
3. Ideology reconsidered
Another indication of the relevance of the legal origins theory
may be in the difficulties with enacting legislation and other
regulation. Certainly the Fed’s refusal to bail out Lehman Brothers
reflected its desire to adhere to legal origins, and hence prefer market
forces to government intervention, even if those forces hastened the
demise of a financial institution. The possibility that the refusal may
have worsened the economic crisis only underscores the strength of
the commitment to common law ideas. Congress’s refusal to bailout
the auto industry also stemmed in part from a desire to steer clear of
government control. And this desire emerged with each successive
stimulus package, making passage of such packages difficult even
when lawmakers were informed that delay could have severe
repercussions for the economy. Hence, despite the apparent need for
government intervention, America’s commitment to common law
ideologies made it difficult to embrace that intervention without
deep reservations. Echoing these reservations, Bush noted that he
was “forced . . . to ignore many of the free-market principles he
came to office embracing.”247
Even after enactment, America’s commitment to common law
principles appears to have prompted it to engage in actions counter
to its self-interest. For example, providing the necessary capital to the
banking industry while avoiding equity stakes and other appearances
of government control of the banking industry required the U.S.
government to engage in unprecedented financial gymnastics.248
Moreover, the administration of TARP is plagued with problems
associated with the government not wanting to appear as if it owns
banks.249 These actions make administering TARP and other
programs more opaque and difficult, but they reflect America’s
commitment to common law principles, even where civil ones may
247. David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A1.
248. See Andrews, supra note 212, at B1 (noting that aid packages to Bank of America
and Citigroup reflected “displays of financial gymnastics aimed at providing capital without
appearing to take commanding equity stakes”).
249. See id.
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be more efficient. Although its response was ultimately legislative in
nature, the United States’ deep reservations and financial gymnastics
may highlight its core commitment to legal origins even in financial
upheaval.
V. CONCLUSION
When you look at the United States response to financial crisis in
light of its legal origins, what emerges is a potentially mixed story.
On the one hand, the government appears to have adopted strategies
wholly antithetical to its legal origins. Perhaps most troubling are the
transactions that appear to result in nationalization of certain banks
and certain industries. Equally troubling is the heavy government
intervention—from bailouts to its role as direct and primary
negotiator in a wide variety of transactions. These actions, combined
with the government’s embrace of steadily broader legislation, belie
any prediction that America’s response would gravitate towards
common law strategies and ideologies. Hence, they pose problems
for the predictive value of the legal origins theory, at least with
respect to the current crisis.
On the other hand, some strands of the crisis legislation and the
United States response firmly embrace its origins and at least reflect a
rhetorical commitment to them. This may suggest that during times
of severe crisis, political, social, and, most importantly, economic
forces may compel the United States to adopt civil-law oriented
solutions. However, those forces do not compel the United States to
eliminate its fundamental orientation. In this regard, legal origins is
relevant, because it may explain the way in which the United States’
problem-solving is inherently limited, while also predicting the
temporary nature of those civil-law oriented solutions.
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